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H.R. 2391: PROTECTING UNIVERSITIES IN 
COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The following two hypotheticals illustrate the problems posed in this 
Note: 
A research team in a biotechnology field is composed of professor, P, 
at a federally funded university, and five members of a company, 
collectively called M. The company researchers approached P regarding 
some fundamental research in which P was involved. P voluntarily shared 
his research and some thoughts with M. M considered the research and 
then developed invention I, using this help from P. Invention I was not 
conceived at the time of the information transfer between P and M. 
Invention I was patented with M named as the inventors. Because M and P 
were not members of the same company nor did they assign rights to a 
common entity, the prior communications between P and M are used to 
render I obvious, and thus ineligible for patent protection.1  
Suppose inventors A and B in a university discover and patent enzyme, 
E. The university then collaborates with inventor C in a company to 
develop E for a downstream product, E’. E’ is then patented, with A, B, 
and C as the inventors. Any conversations of A and B with C before the 
invention of E’ will be prior art to render E’ obvious because the two 
inventive entities are not identical and thus the group A, B, and C 
“derived” the invention from the group A and B. However, if a third party, 
T, develops E’ without any conversations with A and B, no prior art exists 
to render E’ obvious. Thus, a third party can patent an improvement or a 
development of an invention, but the original inventor cannot.2
These two hypotheticals illustrate the problems with the current state of 
patent law. Communications of less than the complete invention can be 
relied upon to reject or invalidate a patent claim.3 This can occur even if 
information was confidential, undocumented, or shared among consenting 
parties.4
Universities, while primarily serving the public good through research, 
teaching, and dissemination of knowledge, also perform research with 
 1. For a discussion on the obviousness determination, see infra Part II.C. 
 2. For a similar example, see Eric K. Steffe et al., Biotech Collaborations and Maximizing 
Patent Protection: Two Hypotheticals, 27 AIPLA Q.J. 149, 160 (1999). 
 3. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra note 125. 
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private companies and the government.5 University research is a 
fundamental step in the development process, and it makes the United 
States a leader in scientific progress and innovation.6 Assignment of the 
rights to the patent is not always an available option to a federally funded 
university early in the research.7 Thus, legislation is needed to help 
universities contribute to strong patents and encourage collaborative 
efforts. 
This Note explains the history of the Patent Act and the importance of 
patents in society.8 The Note then describes the requirements of a 
patentable invention, focusing on the nonobviousness requirement of 35 
U.S.C. § 103.9 Next, the Note analyzes case law that interprets prior art for 
section 103 and leads to the recent decision by the Federal Circuit in 
OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc.10 The Note then examines the 
effect of the OddzOn holding on universities as well as the tension 
between the holding and the legislative intent behind the Patent Act.11 
After establishing the importance of university research, this Note 
discusses a proposed bill to determine whether its elements are necessary 
to protect universities.12
II. HISTORY 
A. Background 
In the age of new and quickly developing technology and 
biotechnology, individual research is becoming inefficient and time 
consuming.13 Instead, collaborations between inventors, companies, and 
 5. See infra note 108. 
 6. See infra Part II.G. The legal system, however, has not yet adapted to the needs of this 
important scientific player. The Bayh-Dole Act encourages public funding of universities, and, while a 
very significant step towards helping universities, can result in restraints on universities that are 
governmentally funded with respect to transferring rights. See infra note 114. 
 7. See infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra Part II.A–B.
 9. See infra Part II.C. 
 10. See infra Part II.D; OddzOn Prod., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 11. See infra Part II.E. 
 12. See infra Part II.F and Part III. 
 13. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, 
Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2000).  
The reasons for this evolution are manifold. In large part, it is a consequence of intellectual 
limitations. In many fields—biotechnology is one example—the intensity of specialization 
makes it nearly impossible for any one researcher to know enough to work alone; 
interdisciplinary investigation is essential if the frontiers of knowledge are to be pushed 
forward. The globalization of the marketplace has also had an influence . . . . Most obviously, 
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industries are now becoming more common.14 With the advent of projects 
such as the Human Genome Project and other biological research, where 
discoveries are useful for multiple and often unknown and unforeseeable 
downstream inventions, scientists from several levels of the development 
process or from different research fields must interact together.15 An 
unescapable consequence of this interdisciplinary interaction is 
communication and the sharing of ideas. This distribution of knowledge is 
important for the success of research and is encouraged by the patent 
laws.16  
The Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) analyzes patentability of an 
invention by looking at the “prior art.”17 Prior art has traditionally included 
only public information, such as existing patents, patent applications,18 and 
journal articles.19 However, the Federal Circuit recently concluded that 
information disclosed to an inventor during private communications in a 
collaborative environment is considered prior art for the purpose of an 
obviousness determination.20 The Patent Act, in section 103(c), prevents 
this type of communication from rendering a patent obvious if the 
collaborative effort occurs in one corporate entity.21 However, there is no 
the growth of the internet has made long distance collaborations much easier. 
Id. 
 14. Id.; see Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2003: 
Hearing on H.R. 2391 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7 (2003) (prepared statement of E. Jonathan Soderstrom, 
Ph.D.) [hereinafter Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2003 Hearing] (“The 
success of bringing . . . countless university inventions to the marketplace has depended on rich 
collaborations among scientists within the university; collaborations among scientists at different 
universities; and collaborations among university and industry scientists.”). 
 15. Interview with John Lamming, Associate General Counsel at Washington University, St. 
Louis, Mo. (Fall 2003) (on file with author). In addition, research may require resources that may not 
be found in one place: Resources such as humans, facilities and equipment, financial support, and 
sometimes, geographic location. Id. 
 16. See infra note 26. 
 17. See infra note 40. 
 18. Until recently, patent applications in the United States were kept secret until issue of patent 
or abandonment. A recent amendment changed this; now the disclosures of a United States patent 
application become prior art as of the earliest effective filing date. Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4505, 113 
Stat. 1501, 1501A-565 (Nov. 29, 1999) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)).  
 19. These elements are laid out in sections 102(a), (b), (e), and (g). See OddzOn, 122 F.3d at 
1402 (“Thus, the patent laws have not generally recognized as prior art that which is not accessible to 
the public.”); see also In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1290 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“Of course, [35 U.S.C. § 102] 
(c), (d), and (f) have no relation to § 103 and no relevancy to what is ‘prior art’ under § 103.”). 
 20. OddzOn, 122 F.3d at 1403–04 (“We therefore hold that subject matter derived from another 
not only is itself unpatentable to the party who derived it under § 102(f), but, when combined with 
other prior art, may make a resulting obvious invention unpatentable to that party under a combination 
of §§ 102(f) and 103.”). 
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) reads: 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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protection if two inventors in the collaboration are from separate 
industries.22  
B. Statutory History 
Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution grants Congress broad 
power to protect authors and inventors by delegating to Congress the 
authority to grant exclusive rights over creations and inventions.23 
Congress may not overreach its authority by enlarging the patent 
monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement, or social benefit 
gained.24  
Patent law has developed over the past 215 years.25 The goal of the 
patent system is to benefit society by encouraging innovation and 
Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only under one or 
more [of] subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 102 of this title, shall not preclude 
patentability under this section where the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at 
the time the invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of 
assignment to the same person. 
35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 22. See id.  
 23. Article I, § 8, clause 8 states that Congress has the power “To promote . . . useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 24. Graham et al. v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966). Thus, Congress may not grant 
patents that remove existing knowledge from the public domain or that restrict free access to materials 
already available. Id. 
 25. The Patent Act of 1790 was America’s first patent statute, but the 1952 Act did more to 
strengthen the area of law. See CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW, 18–22 (Robert Clark et 
al. eds., 2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter CHISUM ET AL.]. The United States Patent Office, while already 
operating, was not officially recognized by law until the 1836 Act. Id. at 20. There is no exact date 
when the Office was created. Id. at 20 n.82. It was neither a part of the Act of 1790 nor the Act of 
1793. Id. Dr. William Thorton was appointed to the Patent Office in 1802, making it a distinct division 
of the Department of State. Id. However, it was not until the 1836 Act that the Patent Office gained 
legitimacy in the eyes of the law and a building was constructed for the Office. Id. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created by Congress in 1982 primarily in response to an 
increase in forum shopping in patent litigation, a lack of uniformity in the patent laws, and a high 
invalidity rate among litigated patents. See id. at 25 n.95 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 312, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 20–22 (1981)). 
Some circuit courts are regarded as “pro-patent” and others “anti-patent,” and much time and 
money is expended in “shopping” for a favorable venue. [In addition,] the validity of a patent 
is too dependent upon geography (i.e., the accident of judicial venue) to make effective 
business planning possible . . . A single court of appeals for patent cases will promote 
certainty where it is lacking to a significant degree and will reduce, if not eliminate, the 
forum-shopping that now occurs. 
Id.; see also id. (citing S. REP. NO. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1981) (“The creation of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity in this area of . . . [patent] law. Such 
uniformity will reduce the forum-shopping that is common to patent litigation.”)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/8
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promoting public disclosure of technological advances.26 The patent laws 
achieve this goal by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited time 
period.27
C. Mechanics of Patent Law 
Patent laws encourage creation of new inventions by guaranteeing 
inventors that their ideas will be protected.28 The system provides a patent 
holder with negative rights, meaning the right to exclude someone from 
using, rather than include someone in using, the invention.29 The patent 
grant is often viewed as a contract between society and the patentee.30 The 
inventor, as consideration to the public, provides a new and useful 
invention.31 In return, the public gives the inventor a monopoly expressed 
by the claims of the patent.32 The inventor risks losing his or her secrecy if 
the patent is held to be invalid or unenforceable.33 However, in earning a 
temporary monopoly, the inventor receives the opportunity to earn back 
the money spent in research and development.34 The system also 
encourages the increased flow of information.35 A very important effect of 
the patent system is to dispel secrecy, which would interfere with the 
advances of the basic norms of science.36
An invention, to be patentable, must be both novel and nonobvious.37 
The novelty requirement demands that something new must be contributed 
 26. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 25, at 70–75. 
 27. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (“The patent laws promote this progress 
by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited period as an incentive for their inventiveness and 
research efforts.”); see infra note 28. 
 28. See Griffith Rubber Mills v. Hoffar, 313 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1963) (indicating that “patents are 
issued not for private benefit but for the public good; they grant a monopoly for a limited period as an 
incentive to the disclosure of innovations which in the end will add to the fund of freely available 
knowledge[.]”); see also Lawrence M. Sung, Collegiality and Collaboration in the Age of Exclusivity, 
3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 411, 412–13 (Spring/Summer 2000) (explaining that “the patent system 
seeks to promote innovation by providing inventors with an opportunity for pecuniary reward through 
the government grant of temporary exclusionary rights in their inventions[.]”).  
 29. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 25, at 3. 
 30. Davis Airfoils, Inc. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 350, 352 (Ct. Cl. 1954). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 25, at 80. 
 34. Id. at 70–71. 
 35. Id. at 72. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 93 n.9. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2000). A possible third requirement, utility, exists 
for patentability. Utility requires that the invention is useful. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 25, at 707. 
This requirement, however, will not be discussed in detail because it is not relevant to this Note.  
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to society.38 The nonobviousness requirement demands that the invention 
be significantly different from the prior art from the standpoint of a person 
having ordinary skill in the art.39 “Prior art” is a term used in patent law to 
refer to known technical information.40 A “person having ordinary skill in 
 38. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 25, at 323. The novelty requirement is embodied in 
sections 102(a), (e) and (g), which read as follows: 
§ 102. Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent 
 A person shall be entitled to a patent unless— 
 (a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in 
a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant 
for patent, or 
 . . . 
 (e) The [sic] invention was described in  
 (1) an application for patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the 
United States before the invention by the applicant for patent . . . or  
 (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States 
before the invention by the applicant for patent . . .; or 
 . . . 
 (g) (1) during the course of an interference . . . another inventor involved therein 
establishes, . . . that before such person’s invention thereof the invention was made by such 
other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, or (2) before such person’s 
invention thereof, the invention was made in this country by another inventor who had not 
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention under this 
subsection, there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction 
to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive 
and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other. 
35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (e), (g) (2000). 
 Section 102(a) contains the first-to-invent rule, which dominates the novelty analysis. See 
MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 248 (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter 
ADELMAN ET AL.]. For discussion on first-to-invent, see infra note 55. “Section 102(a) also requires 
some form of public knowledge of the first inventor’s invention.” ADELMAN ET AL., supra, at 248. 
Section 102(e) concerns a “special” category of secret knowledge, a patent application. Id. Section 
102(g) “covers” secret work by an inventor that becomes public after the invention of the second 
inventor. Id.  
 39. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) states: 
[a] patent may not be obtained [even though the claimed invention may be novel] . . . if the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the 
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art . . . . 
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). 
 See P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. TRAD. OFF. SOC’Y. 161, 180–
81 (1993) (“An invention which has been made, and which is new in the sense that the same thing has 
not been made before, may still not be patentable if the difference between the new thing and what was 
known before is not considered sufficiently great to warrant a patent.”) [hereinafter Federico]. 
 40. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 25, at 93. According to Chisum, prior art is defined as follows: 
[P]rior art constitutes those references which may be used to determine the novelty and 
nonobviousness of claimed subject matter in a patent application or patent. It includes both 
documentary sources (patents and publications from anywhere in the world) and 
nondocumentary sources (things known, used or invented in the United States). A reference 
must be in the art pertinent to the invention in question or in an analogous art. A reference 
must be dated prior to the applicant’s date of invention or, in the case of statutory bars, more 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/8
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the art”41 is a specialized “reasonable man” with the level of skill inferred 
by reviewing the prior art.42 This hypothetical person reflects the 
capabilities of actual practitioners who are active in the field.43
The nonobviousness requirement is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 103(a): “A 
patent may not be obtained . . . if the difference[s] between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was 
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art . . . .”44 This requirement 
is broader than the novelty requirement and guards against the risk that the 
claimed invention may be scattered throughout the prior art and may be 
“obvious” to a person skilled in the art.45
The prior art factual inquiry used for a section 103 obviousness 
determination is guided by the definitions in section 102.46 Section 102(e) 
states that a disclosure of a United States patent application is prior art to 
subject matter invented by others after its U.S. filing date once the PTO 
than one year prior to his date of application for a patent. 
1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY, AND 
INFRINGEMENT (2003) [hereinafter CHISUM ON PATENTS], Glossary: Prior Art. 
 Under section 102(e), prior art takes two forms: publicly accessible and secret. CHISUM ET AL., 
supra note 25, at 324. The secret prior art under section 102(e) is information contained in a patent 
application. The patent application will serve as prior art if the application discloses the claimed 
subject matter and ultimately issues as a patent. Id. 
 41. The acronym, PHOSITA, was coined by Cyril A. Soans in his article Some Absurd 
Presumptions in Patent Cases, 10 IDEA 433, 438 (1966). 
 42. Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Comment Note—Application and Effect of 35 U.S.C.S. § 103, 
Requiring Nonobvious Subject Matter, in Determining Validity of Patents, 23 A.L.R. FED. 326 § 11a 
385 (2003) (stating a specialized “reasonable man” emerges in several recent Supreme Court 
decisions, and the level of his skill may be inferred by reviewing the prior art). 
 43. John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 802 (2003) 
(“[The] fictitious practitioner should be as closely akin to the capabilities of skilled artisans as 
possible.”). 
 44. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). 
 45. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 25, at 514. The test for obviousness of invention to a person of 
ordinary skill in the applicable art includes review of: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) 
differences between prior art and claims at issue; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art. Dann v. 
Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 226 (1976). The mere existence of differences between prior art and invention 
does not establish nonobviousness. Id. at 230. See also In Re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1037 (C.C.P.A. 
1979) (“Test for obviousness is not whether the features of one reference may be bodily incorporated 
into another reference . . . . Rather, we look to see whether combined teachings render the claimed 
subject matter obvious.”).  
 46. Federico, supra note 39, at 180 (“The antecedent of the words ‘the prior art,’ which here 
appear in a statute for the first time, lies in the phrase ‘disclosed or described as set forth in section 
102’ and hence these words refer to material specified in section 102 as the basis for comparison.”). 
See also Riverwood International Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003), 
citing In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 532 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“The term ‘prior art’ as used in section 103 
refers at least to the statutory material named in 35 U.S.C. § 102.”). 
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publishes that application or issues the patent.47 Section 102(f) is called a 
derivation provision because an inventor is not entitled to the patent unless 
he invented the subject matter;48 if the inventor derived the subject matter 
from someone else he is not entitled to the patent.49 Derivation is 
demonstrated when the party from whom the invention was derived 
possessed a complete conception of the invention, and there was a 
sufficient communication to the party charged with derivation to enable a 
person of ordinarily skill in the art to construct and operate the invention.50 
Section 102(g) states that a person is not entitled to a patent if, before the 
patent applicant’s invention, the same invention is made in this country by 
another inventor who had not “abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.”51
The date attributed to a prior art reference for patentability purposes is 
the effective date.52 The earliest date the inventor may claim benefit under 
the statute is the critical date.53 The invention is thus anticipated if the 
effective date of the reference is earlier than this critical date.54 This 
system is called the first-to-invent rule55 and results in the issuance of a 
 47. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2000) (stating a patent is precluded when the “invention was described in 
(1) an application for patent, published under 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the 
invention by the applicant for patent . . . .”). See CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 40, § 3.07[2], at 3-
208 (“The disclosures of a United States patent application become prior art as of the earliest effective 
filing date only after the patent actually issues containing such disclosure.”).  
 The “effective date” is the application filing date, not the patent issuance date. Thus, material is 
prior art for purposes of obviousness at a time when the material is not available to the public. See In 
re Bartfeld, 925 F.2d 1450, 1451 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The effective date of the [section] 102(e) 
reference is the application filing date, not the patent issuance date.”). For a discussion on “effective 
date,” see infra note 52. 
 48. 2 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 40, § 5.03[3][d], at 168 (stating that in its strictest form, 
section 102(f) means that a person who received a complete idea for the invention from another source 
cannot receive a patent on the idea).  
 49. See Ex Parte Billotet and Fechner, 192 U.S.P.Q. 413, 415–16 (P. O. Bd. App. 1976) 
(“Paragraph (f) was historically considered as a section compelling the inventor to be the party 
applying for a patent and traditionally is applicable in the situation where an applicant has derived an 
invention from another.”).  
 50. See Davis v. Reddy, 620 F.2d 885, 889 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (“Since we have held that Reddy has 
failed to prove conception of the invention prior to the meeting by a preponderance of the evidence, it 
follows that he has also failed to prove derivation of the invention by Davis et al. at the meeting.”). 
 51. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000). 
 52. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 25, at 326. 
 53. In a section 102(a) case, the critical date is typically the date of the invention. Id. However, in 
a section 102(b) case, the point in time one year prior to the filing date is termed the critical date. Id. 
See also ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 161. Thus, a one-year “grace period” exists, which allows 
an inventor to determine the desirability of patent protection and to prepare an application. Id.  
 54. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 25, at 326. See, e.g., Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 
1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (examining a section 102(a) case, the court stated the issue as whether the 
publication of the alleged prior art was before the invention date).  
 55. The first-to-invent rule is stated in section 102(a) by supplying a basis for rejection of an 
application which describes an invention “known or used . . . in this country, or patented or described 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/8
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patent to the party who has prior inventorship and who deserves to receive 
a patent, not necessarily the first applicant to file.56 The first-to-invent rule 
can be difficult to apply and requires factual determinations.57 This 
system, however, rewards the actual inventor and not merely the person 
who is fastest to file.58
D. Early Jurisprudence of Section 103 and Section 102 Prior Art 
In In re Bass,59 the PTO rejected claims in a patent application that 
named Bass, Jenkins, and Horvat as co-inventors, as being obvious over 
earlier filed patents to Bass and Jenkins.60 The rationale was that the 
in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for 
patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 160 (“When multiple 
persons claim the right to a patent on a given technology, this system allows inventors who were not 
the first to reach the Patent Office to establish their right to the patent by demonstrating inventive acts 
prior to those of their competitors.”). See also id. at 179 (“The United States . . . promises a patent to 
the first inventor, regardless of whether someone else files an application earlier claiming the same 
invention.”). 
 56. The United States is the only patent-issuing country to have a first-to-invent system. 
ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 160. Other countries have a first-to-file regime in which the 
inventor who first files a patent application obtains the patent, even if another actually invented the 
technology first. Id. 
 57. Section 102(g) states the general rule that the first inventor to reduce an invention to practice 
has priority. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000) (“In determining priority of invention . . . there shall be 
considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but 
also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice . . .”). If an 
inventor is first to conceive an invention but the second to reduce it to practice, he can get priority only 
if he shows he was diligent from the time of conception to the time of reduction to practice. See 
Christie v. Seybold, 55 F. 69, 76 (6th Cir. 1893).  
It is obvious . . . that the man who first reduces an invention to practice is prima facie the first 
and true inventor, but that the man who first conceives, and, in a mental sense, first invents, a 
machine, art, or composition of matter, may date his patentable invention back to the time of 
its conception, if he connects the conception with its reduction to practice by reasonable 
diligence on his part, so that they are substantially one continuous act. 
Id.; Mahurkar, 79 F.3d at 1577 (“[P]riority of the invention goes to the first party to reduce an 
invention to practice unless the other party can show that it was the first to conceive the invention and 
that it exercised reasonable diligence in later reducing that invention to practice.”) (internal citations 
omitted); See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 259. 
 58. Jennifer Chung, Comment, Does Simultaneous Research Make an Invention Obvious? The 
35 U.S.C. § 103 Nonobvious Requirement for Patents as Applied to the Simultaneous Research 
Problem, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 337, 342 (2001). 
 59. 474 F.2d 1276 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 60. Id. at 1277. The applicants, Bass, Jenkins and Horvat claimed a vacuum system to control 
waste on textile cording machines. Id. On March 16, 1967, they filed an application as a continuation-
in-part of an October 11, 1965, application. Id. In rejecting the claims as obvious, the Patent Office 
relied on machinery disclosed in two patents: The first issued to Bass and Horvat on April 25, 1967, 
from an application filed August 23, 1965, and the second issued to Jenkins on an application filed 
October 13, 1964. Id. The applicants filed affidavits under Rule 131 to establish a date of invention 
prior to the filing dates of the two patents. Id. at 1281. The Patent Office found the affidavits, while 
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claims in the later filed patent application were merely an obvious 
variation of what had been reduced to practice in the earlier filed patents.61 
Thus, the application was rejected under section 103 by virtue of 
section 102(g).62 This rejection was deemed applicable because the 
“inventive entity” of the earlier filed patents was not identical to the 
“inventive identity” of the later filed patent application.63 Rejection of the 
patent was also deemed appropriate even though the invention and the 
earlier reduction to practice occurred within the same company.64 This 
case first established that section 102(g) could be used in combination 
with other references to support a section 103 nonobvious rejection.65
In 1984, amendments to the Patent Act66 were passed in direct response 
to In Re Bass, which some argued created a disincentive to file patents 
early and discouraged communications among co-workers.67 Congress 
amended section 103 to disqualify events that fall exclusively within 
sections 102(f) or (g) from use as prior art under section 103 under 
specific conditions.68 This amendment became section 103(c), which 
reads: 
Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as 
prior art only under one or more of subsections (e), (f), and (g) of 
sufficient for removing the two patents as references, insufficient to remove the work as evidence of 
prior invention under section 102(g). Id. at 1281–82. Due to the relationship between the parties and 
the ownership of both applications by the same company, it can be assumed that the three applications 
were filed in the order of invention. Id. at 1282. 
 61. Id. at 1277. 
 62. Id. at 1282. 
 63. Id. at 1288. 
 64. Id. at 1287. 
 65. In re Bass was followed by In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029 (C.C.P.A. 1980). In Clemens, there 
was no knowledge of the first invention by the second inventor. The court held that for a prior 
invention to qualify as prior art under section 102(g), there must be a communication of the invention. 
Id. at 1039. This ruling changed with the decision of Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson 
Personal Prod. Co. The court stated that section 102(g) can be considered prior art under section 103 
and the personal knowledge requirement from Clemens was irrelevant in the analysis. 745 F.2d 1437, 
1445 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Finally, in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., the court 
held that section 102(g) subject matter is prior art under section 103 whether or not personal 
knowledge is proven. 849 F.2d 1430, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 66. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, H.R. 6286, 98th Cong. (1984) (codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 116 (1994)) [hereinafter H.R. 6286].  
 67. Section by Section: Patent Law Amendments of 1984, 130 Cong. Rec. H10525, H.R. 6286, 
98th Cong. (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5833 (1984) [hereinafter Section by Section: 
Patent Law Amendments of 1984] (“[T]he bill changes a complex body of case law which discourages 
communication among members of research teams working in corporations, universities or other 
organizations.”). 
 68. H.R. 6286, supra note 66. In 1999, (e) was added as well in the American Inventor’s 
Protection Act, H.R. 1907, 106th Cong. (1999). 
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section 102 of this title, shall not preclude patentability under this 
section where the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at 
the time the invention was made, owned by the same person or 
subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.69
Historically, it is very clear that this amendment was intended to avoid 
the invalidation of patents under section 103 on the basis of the work of 
fellow employees engaged in team research.70
Unlike section 102(g), controversy surrounds whether section 102(f) is 
a prior art section making the section 102(f) art available in obviousness 
determinations.71 The 102(f) subsection applies to public knowledge and 
to private communications, including communications made under a 
secrecy agreement.72 The historical concept of a “completed idea” has 
defeated the claim that section 102(f) is prior art under section 103.73 The 
issue of section 102(f) as prior art has arisen in three recent cases: Lamb-
 69. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2000).  
 70. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distributing Co., Inc., 973 F.2d 911, 917 
(Fed. Cir. 1992).  
A purpose of the 1984 amendment to Section 103 was to overturn a line of cases under which 
a prior invention which was not public could be treated under Section 102(g) as prior art for 
purposes of Section 103 with respect to a later invention made by another employee of the 
same organization. 
Id.; Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 157 (1984) (prepared 
statement by John E. Maurer, General Consulting Attorney, Monsanto Co.):  
In view of the increasingly complex nature of the technological problems associated with 
research today, and the increasing cost of research, it is not sound public policy to penalize 
organizations which take a team approach to the solution of problems. By allowing this 
situation to continue as is is to add a further element of unreliability to the patent grant as a 
driving force for innovation. This situation is also counterproductive to the fundamental 
reason for the patent system because it discourages the disclosure of new technology through 
patenting. 
Id.; 130 Cong. Rec. H28071 (Oct. 1, 1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5833–34 (discussing 
problems caused by In Re Bass); 129 Cong. Rec. H34801 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983) (statement by Rep. 
Kastenmeier).  
H.R. 4525, provides that unpublished information known to the inventor does not constitute 
prior art in the field of the invention, and therefore cannot serve to defeat the patentability of 
that invention . . . This provision has the net effect of overruling In re Bass . . . This 
amendment, or a substantially similar bill, will be of material benefit to university and 
corporate research laboratories where the free exchange of ideas and concepts may have been 
hampered by the current state of the law with respect to what constitutes “prior art.” 
Id. 
 71. Steffe, supra note 2, at 161. Subsection (e), however, has long been established as prior art 
since it is public information. See Oddzon, 122 F.3d at 1401. 
 72. Steffe, supra note 2, at 162. 
 73. Philip McGarrigle, Comment, Oddzon Prod., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc.: Prior Knowledge of 35 
U.S.C. § 102(f) Clarified, 38 IDEA 673, 677 (1998). 
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Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd.;74 Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp.;75 and OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc.76  
In Lamb-Weston, the issue was whether the patent was invalid when 
the prior art subject matter only qualified as such under section 102(f).77 
However, the court never reached the question of whether section 102(f) is 
prior art for section 103 purposes because it was the machines which 
produced the products at issue that were protected by confidentiality 
agreements, not the products themselves.78 In dicta, the court noted that 
the amendment to section 103 seemed to provide authority for considering 
section 102(f) in the context of section 103.79
 74. 78 F.3d 540 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 75. 110 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 76. Oddzon, 122 F.3d at 1396. 
 77. 78 F.3d at 544. 
 78. Id. Lamb-Weston, under confidentiality agreements, examined two different apparatuses 
used for cutting frozen potato products. Id. at 542. It then began manufacturing and using its own 
machine and patented the “waffle fries” it made. Id. A competitor began making and selling waffle 
fries, and Lamb-Weston sued for infringement. Id. at 543. The district court found the patent obvious 
due to the apparatuses examined by Lamb-Weston under the confidentiality agreement. Id. The Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the potato products produced by the apparatus, not the 
devices themselves, provide the motivation to combine, and these products were not subject to a 
confidentiality agreement. Id. at 544. 
 79. In a footnote, the court states: “This court need not reach the significant issue of whether 
§ 102(f) of title 35 defines prior art for an obviousness determination under § 103 . . .” Id. at 544. The 
footnote also includes other potential authority for the conclusion that section 102(f) can be considered 
under section 103.  
However, the following contrary authorities should also be considered: 35 U.S.C. § 103 
(1994) (“Subject matter developed by another person which qualifies as prior art only under 
subsection (f) or (g) of section 102 . . . [shall not preclude patentability if owned by the same 
entity].”) (emphasis added); 2 Donald S. Chisum, Patents, § 5.03 [3] (1994) (“However, it is 
now clear that section 102(e) (description in prior co-pending patent application that ripens 
into a patent), section 102(g) (prior invention), and section 102 (f) (derivation from another) 
may also be relied upon to show obviousness.”) (emphasis added); Dale Elec. v. R.C.L. Elec., 
488 F.2d 382, 386, 180 USPQ (BNA) 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1973) (Actual knowledge of 
invention by another makes references defined by 102(f) prior art for obviousness 
determinations.); New England Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 883, 23 
USPQ2D (BNA) 1622, 1626 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“To invalidate a patent for derivation of 
invention, a party must demonstrate that the named inventor . . . acquired knowledge of the 
claimed invention from another, or at least so much of the claimed invention as would have 
made it obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.106(d) (1995) (“Subject 
matter which is developed by another person which qualifies as prior art only under 35 U.S.C. 
102(f) or (g) may be used as prior art under 35 U.S.C. 103 against a claimed invention . . . .”). 
Id.  
 Judge Newman, in her dissent, responded to the majority: 
The panel majority cites by footnote the second paragraph of § 103 as “authority” for the 
proposition that § 102(f) information is prior art. The cited provision was added to § 103 in 
1984, to facilitate team research by precluding the citation of the work of one team member 
as prior art against the invention of another . . . . The majority also cites Dale Elect. v. R.C.L. 
Elect., . . . which states broadly that all of § 102 qualifies as prior art, an oversimplification 
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In Gambro,80 the court reviewed the dictum in New England Braiding 
Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co.81 The Gambro court found that this dictum did 
not in fact incorporate a determination of obviousness into 
section 102(f).82 Thus, the court concluded that the district court 
incorrectly introduced an obviousness analysis into the test for derivation 
when the lower court stated that Baxter did not need to prove 
communication of the entire conception, but rather only so much of the 
invention that would have made it obvious to one ordinarily skilled in the 
art.83 Instead, applying the standard of “whether the communication 
enabled one of ordinary skill in the art to make the patented invention,” 
the appellate court held that there was insufficient evidence of 
never endorsed by the Federal Circuit. Nor does the partial quotation from Chisum, or the 
usage in New England Braiding, advance consideration of the matter. 
Id. at 549 n.5. Instead, Judge Newman uses the language from In re Bass: 
Section 102(f) relates to “derivation,” the taking of the invention of another and patenting it 
as one’s own. It is irrelevant whether or not that invention is also prior art. As explained in In 
re Bass, § 102(f) relates to originality, that “one who ‘did not himself invent the subject 
matter’ (i.e., he did not originate it) has no right to a patent on it.” . . . The court explained in 
Bass that § 102(f) has “no relation to § 103 and no relevency to what is ‘prior art’ under 
§ 103.” 
Id. at 549. 
 80. 110 F.3d 1573. Repgreen Limited (“Repgreen”) is a British bioengineering company. Id. at 
1575. Repgreen improved ultrafiltrate calculation by the work of Keith Wittingham, Repgreen’s chief 
designer, in late 1977. Id. In the late 1970s, Gambro sought to improve ultrafiltrate monitoring, so 
during 1979, Wittingham met with Gambro engineers to discuss Repgreen’s development of an 
ultrafiltrate monitor for Gambro. Id. In July 1979 Gambro purchased Repgreen’s hemodialysis 
technology and worked for three years to improve the ultrafiltration monitors. Id. Finally, in June 
1982, Gambro engineers refined the monitoring system. Id. Gambro filed a patent on a system to 
improve ultrafiltrate monitoring based on technology purchased from Repgreen. Id. Subsequently, 
Baxter began marketing their own monitoring device and Gambro sued for infringement of their 
patent. Id. at 1576. Baxter alleges the patent was unenforceable because it was obvious due to 
conversations Wittingham had with Gambro employees. Id. 
 81. New England Braiding Co., Inc. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In 
New England Braiding, an engineer at the defendant company had overcome a problem with braided 
compression packing in the early 1970s. Id. at 881. Another engineer, who had worked at Chesterton 
during this period and then left the company, subsequently filed and obtained his own patent. Id. He 
licensed his patent to New England Braiding, who then sued Chesterton. Id. at 882. The district court 
denied New England Braiding’s motion for a preliminary injunction on the basis of a section 102(f) 
and section 103 combination. Id. The Federal Circuit, while not deciding the substantive section 102(f) 
issue, decided that the district court did not seriously misjudge the evidence. Id. at 884. 
 In dictum the court stated: 
To invalidate a patent for derivation of invention, a party must demonstrate that the named 
inventor in the patent acquired knowledge of the claimed invention from another, or at least 
so much of the claimed invention as would have made it obvious to one of ordinary skill in 
the art. 
Id. at 883. 
 82. 110 F.3d at 1578. 
 83. Id. at 1577. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p557 note Tyres book pages.doc12/22/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
570 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:557 
 
 
 
 
 
 
communication.84 As a result of these cases, the issue of section 102(f) as 
prior art was not resolved and was ripe for the decision in OddzOn 
Products.85
E. OddzOn Decision 
OddzOn is a toy and sporting goods company that has a patent on the 
“Vortex,” a foam football-shaped ball with a tail and fin structure.86 
OddzOn sued Just Toys for design patent infringement and the district 
court found, on cross-motions for summary judgment, that the patent was 
valid.87 According to the district court, two confidential designs had been 
disclosed to the inventor.88 These designs qualified as subject matter under 
section 102(f), and furthermore, the district court determined that the 
section 102(f) prior art could be combined with other prior art designs for 
purposes of a challenge to validity under section 103.89 However, the 
district court held that the patented design was not obvious in light of the 
prior art, including these two designs.90 The Federal Circuit directly 
addressed the question of whether “subject matter encompassed within 
§ 102(f) is prior art for purposes of an obviousness inquiry under § 103.”91 
The court held that “a fair reading of § 103, as amended in 1984, leads to 
the conclusion that § 102(f) is a prior art provision for purposes of 
§ 103.”92  
The OddzOn court examined In Re Bass and agreed that because 
section 102(f) is not “public” information, it is counterintuitive to consider 
it as prior art.93 However, the court acknowledged that after In re Bass was 
 84. Id. at 1578. 
 85. OddzOn, 122 F.3d at 1396. 
 86. Id. at 1399. 
 87. Id. at 1400. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1401. OddzOn argues that because these disclosures are not known to the public, they 
are not prior art, which provides actual or constructive public knowledge. Id. OddzOn contends that 
while the disclosures may, under section 102(f), constitute patent-defeating subject matter, they cannot 
be combined with “real” prior art to defeat patentability in a combination of section 102(f) and section 
103. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  
Thus, the patent laws have not generally recognized as prior art that which is not accessible to 
the public. It has been a basic principle of patent law, subject to minor exceptions, that prior 
art is: technology already available to the public. It is available, in legal theory at least, when 
it is described in the world’s accessible literature, including patents, or has been publicly 
known or in . . . public use or on sale in this country. That is the real meaning of prior art in 
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decided, Congress amended section 103, and the court analyzed the effect 
of the amendments on the state of the law.94 The court noted that the 
statutory language clearly stated that subsections (f) and (g) cannot be 
combined with other prior art to render a claimed invention obvious when 
the relevant prior art is commonly owned with the claimed invention at the 
time the invention was made.95 Thus, the court concluded that even though 
the statute does not explicitly state that subsection (f) creates a type of 
prior art for purposes of section 103, the language does state that 
subsection (f) is not prior art in limited circumstances and therefore clearly 
implies that in other circumstances, it would be prior art.96 The court then 
held: “subject matter derived from another not only is itself unpatentable 
to the party who derived it under § 102(f), but, when combined with other 
prior art, may make a resulting obvious invention unpatentable to that 
party under a combination of §§ 102(f) and 103.”97  
legal theory—it is knowledge that is available, including what would be obvious from it, at a 
given time, to a person of ordinary skill in the art. 
Id. at 1402 (citing Kimberly-Clark Corp., 745 F.2d at 1453) (internal citations omitted). 
 94. Id. at 1402–03. 
 95. Id. at 1403. 
 96. Id.  
While the statute does not expressly state in so many words that § 102(f) creates a type of 
prior art for purposes of § 103, nonetheless that conclusion is inescapable; the language that 
states that § 102(f) subject matter is not prior art under limited circumstances clearly implies 
that it is prior art otherwise. That is what Congress wrote into law in 1984 and that is the way 
we must read the statute. 
Id. 
 97. Id. at 1403–04. The court decided to take an affirmative stand on the issue of whether 
section 102(f) is prior art for purposes of section 103. However, the court did leave open an invitation 
for Congress to change the outcome. 
It is sometimes more important that a close question be settled one way or another than which 
way it is settled. We settle the issue here (subject of course to any later intervention by 
Congress or review by the Supreme Court), and do so in a manner that best comports with the 
voice of Congress. Thus, while there is a basis for an opposite conclusion, principally based 
on the fact that § 102(f) does not refer to public activity, as do the other provisions that 
clearly define prior art, nonetheless we cannot escape the import of the 1984 amendment.  
Id. at 1403. 
 The court rationalized that the conclusion was not illogical. Id. at 1403. An invention, A’, that is 
obvious in view of subject matter A, which is derived from another, is unpatentable. The obvious 
invention, A’, may not be unpatentable if A and A’ are designated to the same inventor. It also may 
not be unpatentable if the inventor of A’ did not receive disclosure of A. However, it would be 
unpatentable to the party who did receive the disclosure. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p557 note Tyres book pages.doc12/22/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
572 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:557 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F. Proposed Legislation 
Proposed legislation, H.R. 2391, entitled the Cooperative Research and 
Technology Enhancement (“CREATE”) Act of 2003,98 amends the 
wording of section 102(f) and section 103(c) in response to the OddzOn 
decision.99 The bill proposes an exception to prior art under section 102(f): 
“except that subject matter under this subsection shall not be considered 
prior art or as evidence of obviousness under section 103 of this title.”100 
The bill proposes to change section 103(c) to read as follows: 
Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as 
prior art only under one or both of subsections (e) and (g) of section 
102 of this title, shall not preclude patentability under this section 
where the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at the time 
of the earliest filing date for which a benefit is sought under this 
title, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of 
assignment to the same person.101
H.R. 2391 is proposed in response to the holding in OddzOn.102 The 
purpose of H.R. 2391 is “[one, to] promote communication among team 
 98. Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (“CREATE”) Act of 2003, H.R. 2391, 
108th Cong. (2003). H.R. 2391 was amended and passed in the House of Representatives on March 
10, 2004. The recent amendments resulted in a very different proposed bill. This Note discusses the 
theories, advantages and disadvantages of the bill before the recent amendments. For a discussion on 
the potential effects of the new amendments, see infra note 122. This Note does not support the bill as 
recently amended. 
 99. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 100. H.R. 2391, supra note 98. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2003 Hearing, supra note 14, at 
8 (prepared statement of E. Jonathan Soderstrom, Ph.D.) (“The holding in OddzOn, while accurately 
interpreting the law, nonetheless is a wake-up call to the patent community that information under 
102(f) or (g) could invalidate a patent in the circumstances of a collaborative research effort.”). See 
also id. at 36 (statement of Jeffrey Paul Kushan):  
In my view, the Federal Circuit in OddzOn correctly construed § 103(c), despite the 
inconsistency of its substantive effect with the historical function and purpose of § 102(f). I 
believe it would be unlikely that the Federal Circuit would reach a different conclusion 
regarding the role of § 102(f) “information” in an obviousness determination if similar facts 
were presented to it today . . . . Testimony offered last year by the university community cited 
a number of concerns with the state of the law after the 1984 amendments and the OddzOn 
opinion . . . . I believe that these concerns are legitimate. I also believe other significant 
problems exist with the state of the law after OddzOn . . . . Correcting these problems will 
require amendments to the patent law that eliminate the ability of confidential information 
that cannot qualify as prior art from being used in obviousness determinations. 
Id.; Patent Law and Non-profit Research Collaboration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 1–2 (2002) 
[hereinafter Patent Law and Non-profit Research Collaboration Hearing (2002)] (statement by the 
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researchers located at multiple organizations; [two,] to discourage those 
who would use the discovery process to harass co-inventors who 
voluntarily collaborated on research; [three,] to increase public 
knowledge; and [four,] to accelerate the commercial availability of new 
inventions.”103 Congress’ concern is the effect of the ruling in OddzOn on 
research universities and non-profit institutions.104 The bill purports to 
encourage research collaboration between different institutions in two 
ways.105 First, CREATE encourages communication between inventors, 
even where they are at separate institutions, by removing section 102(f) as 
prior art for section 103 purposes.106 Second, CREATE provides flexibility 
for collaborating institutions by allowing them to make the decision of 
common ownership at the later date of patent application filing.107
G. University Contributions 
Universities are a fundamental source of research for companies and 
good for the economy generally.108 University research results in fast 
Honorable Howard Coble, a Representative in Congress from the State of North Carolina, and 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property):  
The Subcommittee has been approached by the university community with serious concerns 
about an issue arising from a recent case interpreting the Patent Act. In the OddzOn Products 
case, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that certain confidential material 
exchanged in the course of a research collaboration would defeat the patents later developed 
. . . . It is appropriate for our Subcommittee to review this apparent quirk under section 103(c) 
of the Patent Act . . . 
Id. 
 103. Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2003 Hearing, supra note 14, at 
2 (statement of the Honorable Lamar Smith, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and 
Intellectual Property). 
 104. Patent Law and Non-profit Research Collaboration Hearing (2002), supra note 102, at 4 
(prepared statement by the Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the State 
of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property):  
A decision by the Federal Circuit in 1997 showed us that information qualifying as prior art 
under subsections 102(f) or 102(g) of Title 35 can be used to dismiss a patent application as 
obvious under subsection 103(c) of Title 35 . . . . What makes this particularly troubling is 
that this affects research universities and non-profit institutions much more than it does 
private companies. 
Id. 
 105. Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2003 Hearing, supra note 14, at 
16 (prepared statement of Eric K. Steffe). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Universities transfer technology to facilitate the commercialization of research results for the 
public good, to reward, retain, and recruit faculty, to induce closer ties to industry, and to generate 
income and promote economic growth. See AUTM report: The Association of University Technology 
Managers, Inc., report entitled, AUTM Licensing Survey, FY2002: A Survey Summary of Technology 
Licensing and Related Performance for U.S. and Canadian Academic and Nonprofit Institutions, and 
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availability of inventions to the public, provides necessary funding for 
education, and exposes students and faculty to advanced training and 
technology.109 University research also provides funding and patents in the 
scientific world.110 Research collaborations are a key element to the 
success of the United States economy as a whole.111  
Beginning with the 1984 amendments, legislators showed concern with 
communications in research collaboration.112 The pending legislation is 
Patent Management [and Investment] Firms, available at http://www.autm.net/surveys/02/ 
2002spublic.pdf [hereinafter AUTM Licensing Survey, FY2002 Survey Summary], at 1 (finding that the 
total fiscal year of 2002 sponsored research expenditures were $37 billion reported by 212 institutions; 
expenditures funded by federal government sources were $27 billion reported by 192 institutions; 
expenditures funded by industry were $3 billion reported by 199 institutions). In addition, many new 
and important products have resulted from university based research. See id. at 2–5 (listing examples 
of products resulting from university based research, including: SpeechEasy®, Partners for a Healthy 
Baby Curriculum, Oragenics, Inc., Double Transgenic Mouse for Alzheimers, and Broadband Wiring 
in the Hospital Industry). See AUTM report: The Association of University Technology Managers, 
Inc., report entitled, AUTM Licensing Survey, FY2001: A Survey Summary of Technology Licensing 
(and Related) Performance for US and Canadian Academic and Nonprofit Institutions, and Patent 
Management Firms, available at http://www.autm.net/index_ie.html [hereinafter AUTM Licensing 
Survey, FY2001 Survey Summary], at 1 (finding that sponsored research at academic institutions 
exceeded $31 billion; over 4,000 new license and option agreements were executed with nearly 23,000 
such agreements currently active; nearly 360 new commercial products were brought to the market 
under license to a commercial partner; and 494 new companies were formed on a license from an 
academic institution). See also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CAPITALIZING ON NEW NEEDS AND 
NEW OPPORTUNITIES: GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY PARTNERSHIPS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES 1 (2001), available at http://books.nap.edu/books/0309082579/html/ 
1.html#pagetop (“Government funding of research—especially university-based research—is an 
essential part of this framework of support. Policies encouraging partnerships and other cooperative 
arrangements among universities, industry, and the government have proved, in some cases, to be 
effective measures to foster the development of new productivity-enhancing technologies.”); 
NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS—1998 32 (National Science 
Foundation 1998), available at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind98/pdf/c4.pdf.  
Evidence of growing cooperation between federal laboratories and private sector entities can 
be seen in the number of cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs) 
executed in the past few years. These formal agreements were created by Congress under the 
belief that federal laboratories hold valuable technological assets and that those assets should 
be used not only for pursuing an agency’s mission but also to improve the competitive 
position of U.S. firms. Thus, the purpose of CRADAs is to facilitate and expedite the transfer 
of technology from federal laboratories to the private sector by enabling private sector 
researchers to gain access to and take advantage of government R&D expertise and resources. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 109. See Patent Law and Non-profit Research Collaboration Hearing (2002), supra note 102, at 1 
(statement of Honorable Howard Coble). 
 110. See AUTM Licensing Survey, FY2002 Survey Summary, supra note 108, at 1 (finding 7,741 
new United States patents were filed by 216 institutions, 15,573 invention disclosures were reported 
by 221 institutions, and 26,086 licenses and options were active, reported by 217 institutions). 
 111. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 108, at 1. 
 112. See Section by Section: Patent Law Amendments of 1984, supra note 67, at 5833. 
Section 104 of the bill changes a complex body of case law which discourages 
communications among members of research teams working in corporations, universities or 
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aimed at preserving the dynamic between academia and the private 
sector.113 Whether university research is governmentally funded and, thus, 
governed by the Bayh-Dole Act114 or privately funded, universities face 
legal obstacles in collaborations.115 In the face of the ruling in OddzOn, 
legislation is needed to sustain university collaboration with the private 
sector. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Federal Circuit in the OddzOn decision created a strong tension 
with the legislative intent behind the 1984 amendments.116 Congress, in 
passing the 1984 amendments, recognized the importance of research 
teams, and the OddzOn decision significantly narrowed the protection of 
universities participating in research teams with private companies. 
However, the Federal Circuit was literally correct in interpreting the 
statute, and it is unlikely that another court can legally come to a different 
conclusion as long as the current wording of the Patent Act stands.117 
other organizations . . . New technology often is developed by using background scientific or 
technical information known within an organization but unknown to the public. The bill, by 
disqualifying such background information from prior art, will encourage communication 
among members of research teams, and patenting, and consequently public dissemination, of 
the results of “team research.” 
Id.; see Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before the Subcomm. on 
Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 70. 
 113. See Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2003 Hearing, supra note 14 
and Patent Law and Non-profit Research Collaboration Hearing (2002), supra note 102. 
 114. The Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to retain ownership of inventions resulting from 
federally funded research. Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2003 Hearing, 
supra note 14, at 6 (prepared statement by E. Jonathan Soderstrom, Ph.D.). In addition, the universities 
manage the licensing of patents for commercial product development. Id. Prior to the Act, the 
government owned the inventions and had responsibility for licensing them. Since the Act, numerous 
pharmaceutical and medical products, environmentally friendlier manufacturing technologies, and 
inventions improving public safety have resulted from the transfer of federally funded research from 
universities to the business community, and then to the consumers. Id. The Bayh-Dole Act, however, 
requires universities to obtain permission from the federal agency that funds their research before 
transferring any patent rights. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015–28 (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211, 301–307). 
 115. See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 13, at 1161 (discussing problems posed in collaborative 
research). 
 116. See supra notes 67 and 70. Congress wanted to encourage open communication among 
members of research teams. In 1984, Congress was faced with the problem of research teams in a 
corporation. Now, collaborative research with universities and private companies is arguably just as 
important as inter-company research was in 1984.  
 117. See Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2003 Hearing, supra note 
14, at 8 (prepared statement of Jon Soderstrom, Ph.D.); see also id. at 36 (statement of Jeffrey Paul 
Kushan). 
In my view, the Federal Circuit in OddzOn correctly construed § 103(c), despite the 
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Thus, Congress must step in and clarify the statute to correspond with 
legislative intent.118
The rationale behind the 1984 amendments was that any technological 
information brought into a research team comprised of employees of the 
same company should not be considered prior art for a section 103 
analysis.119 Congress wanted researchers, when working in a team setting, 
to bring their knowledge and information to the table in order to increase 
dissemination of knowledge and further innovation.120  
The same reasoning is applied to a research team composed of 
individuals from various industries and companies. The goal of the 
research team is to combine knowledge and information. Characterizing 
information that one participant voluntarily brought to the team as prior art 
for the later patented invention stifles innovation by discouraging 
participants from bringing information to the team.121
inconsistency of its substantive effect with the historical function and purpose of § 102(f). I 
believe it would be unlikely that the Federal Circuit would reach a different conclusion 
regarding the role of § 102(f) “information” in an obviousness determination if similar facts 
were presented to it today. 
Id. 
 118. However, the obvious question to ask at this point is: How big of a problem is this really? On 
the whole, universities are known for over-patenting, not under-patenting. They are able to easily 
determine inventions and quickly protect them. Scientists are well aware of what has been invented in 
their field and understand the importance of filing for patent protection. If an inventor knows of a 
pending application that may serve as prior art, the inventor can file a patent application for the 
subsequent invention as a continuation or a continuation-in-part application, thus receiving the priority 
date of the prior application and eliminating it as prior art. Also, inventors can make use of the 
provisional application and disclose an invention as soon as possible after conception. The inventor 
has up to one year to file a patent application, and that application will carry the filing date of the 
provisional application as its effective date. Also, as previously discussed, universities do not want to 
hold joint inventorship because of all the hassles. Thus, in collaborative research, a great deal of effort 
is put into deciding how to break the rights apart. As a result, before any legislation is passed, the need 
for the legislation must be undoubtedly proven. 
 119. Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2003 Hearing, supra note 14, at 
1 (statement of the Honorable Lamar Smith, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and 
Intellectual Property).  
The legislative history [of the 1984 amendments] makes clear that Congress intended to 
discourage individuals from attempting to use non-public information, also known as ”secret 
prior art,” to challenge the issuance or validity of a patent where co-inventors voluntarily 
exchanged confidential information concerning a prior invention developed by one or more of 
the research partners. 
Id. 
 120. In addition, when employees create an invention, the patent is normally assigned to the 
company anyway, not to the individual inventors. See CHISUM, ET AL., supra note 25, at 488 (“[M]ost 
employees agree to assign ownership rights in the invention to their employer as part of an express 
contract.”). 
 121. See Patent Law and Non-profit Research Collaboration Hearing (2002), supra note 102, at 
14 (statement of Carl E. Gulbrandsen) (“Thus, while the need for collaborative research in the public 
interest is becoming more and more evident, the OddzOn decision exerts a substantial chilling effect 
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Thus, Congress faces a similar problem today that it faced in 1984. In 
1984 Congress amended section 103(c) to exempt members of a research 
team when they all worked for the same company.122 In order to find the 
best solution, the similar problem created today must be completely 
scrutinized.  
The “Oddzon problem” occurs when: (1) there is no obligation for 
common ownership or assignment before an invention is made; (2) one 
party in the research team conveys information that, when combined with 
other prior art, renders the invention obvious; and (3) the party conveying 
that information is not part of the inventive entity named in the 
application.123 The difficulties lie in the first and third criteria of the 
OddzOn problem. 
The first criterion requires a situation with no obligation for common 
ownership or assignment before the time of invention. Researchers who 
enter into a defined and structured research collaboration, but who do not 
immediately transfer their rights124 to a single entity, can create obstacles 
to obtaining or enforcing a patent on an invention that arises from the 
collaboration.125 If there is common ownership or assignment, the safe-
on collaborative efforts among universities, the private sector and the government.”).  
 122. However, a similar clause exempting “collaborative research projects” is not the solution 
today. This was proposed in 2002, but several problems surfaced. See Patent Law and Non-profit 
Research Collaboration Hearing (2002), supra note 102, at 22–25 (statement by Jon D. Grossman). 
Among the hesitations voiced was the difficulty that such a fact finding procedure would have on the 
PTO. Determining whether members all work in the same company is much easier than figuring out 
whether a collaborative research project existed, when it was formed, and who it included. Such an 
amendment will impose a burden on the PTO. A new factor must be investigated and proved—the 
collaboration. Patent examiners will have to judge whether the burden of proving a collaboration has 
been met. This requires education in contract law and the rules of evidence, two areas in which patent 
examiners do not always have expertise. The amendment does not just reach universities; it also 
applies to private companies. The amendment may create a loophole for private companies engaged in 
collaborative research by over extending protection to the point of creating an anticompetitive effect. 
Large companies, already obtaining a steady stream of patents, may set up a joint research agreement 
and thus be afforded greater protection by the amendment and decreased competition between each 
other. Smaller companies would be hurt. Small companies would also be hurt with respect to the 
university research. Often companies fund universities with strings attached, such as first choice on 
any inventions that come out of the research. With the amendment, small businesses may be squeezed 
out of the collaborative arrangements with universities, thus decreasing competition. 
 123. Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2003 Hearing, supra note 14, at 
36 (statement of Jeffrey Paul Kushan). 
 124. The transferring of rights relates to both future inventions and also background technology on 
which the collaboration is based. 
 125. See Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2003 Hearing, supra note 
14, at 9 (statement of E. Jonathan Soderstrom, Ph.D.).  
The information exchanged under the collaboration does not have to be publicly disclosed or 
commonly known [to serve to invalidate the patent]. Instead, all that is required is that the 
collaborators exchange the information without first designating common ownership of the 
information or of any invention that may arise from the collaboration. 
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harbor provision of section 103(c) is invoked. However, this may often not 
be the case for universities involved in collaborative research projects.  
Universities must be protected.126 The OddzOn decision hit universities 
harder than it impacted private companies because private companies have 
ways of maneuvering around section 103 by transferring patent rights.127 A 
federally funded university may not be able to transfer its rights to the 
company.128 If the university has federal funding, it must first receive the 
permission of the federal agency to transfer its rights to the company.129 
This could be problematic if the university does not yet know exactly what 
it will be inventing. In addition, there is a public concern that, in effect, 
society will be paying for the research of a private company. And finally, 
there are many cultural differences between academic science and 
industrial science, which lead to differences in approaches to both research 
and legal issues.130  
Id. 
 126. See supra Part II.G. A strong need exists for consolidating patent rights to a single owner. If 
both the university and the company are named as inventors, each can fully exploit the invention. The 
incidents of joint ownership are codified in 35 U.S.C. § 262: 
In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of the joint owners of a patent may 
make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within the United States, or import the 
patented invention into the United States, without the consent of and without accounting to 
the other owners.  
35 U.S.C. § 262 (2000). If the two inventors, companies or industries do not agree, the relationship 
may become messy and cumbersome. Also, as a joint inventor, the university must participate in any 
lawsuits over relating to the patent. See 8 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 40, § 21.03[3][d], at 548. 
Thus, there is a strong need to consolidate an invention to a single owner. However, with the current 
state of the law, this must be done early in the research before the invention is conceived, otherwise 
conversations sharing independent research to be used in the collaboration between the inventors will 
be considered “prior art” and may render the patent invalid.  
 127. Janet Reed lists four ways private collaborations may be able to maneuver around the 
OddzOn problem. See Patent Law and Non-profit Research Collaboration Hearing (2002), supra note 
102, at 39–42 (prepared statement of Janet E. Reed). Section 103(c) provides an exemption and 
various structural mechanisms that can be used by private companies to fall into the exception. First, 
one private employer can assign its rights to the other private employer. This is probably not an 
attractive solution for many companies. Second, the collaborating entities can create a shell company 
or a joint venture to which they can both assign their rights. Third, the individual researchers can each 
simultaneously assign their patent rights to both entities. Finally, the companies can use contracts to 
manipulate the scope of the assignment. Id. at 40. 
 128. It is often difficult to determine the likelihood of commercial success of a particular 
invention or its downstream uses. For this reason, it is unlikely that a company is willing to transfer all 
of its rights to a university and thus risk losing out on a very profitable invention. 
 129. Under the Bayh-Dole Act, if an invention is made in whole, or in part, with federal funds, 
universities may not freely transfer rights to any commercial entity. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-517, 94 Stat. 3015–28 (codified as amended at 35 USC §§ 200–211, 301–307); see supra note 114. 
 130. Differences exist in the rewards system: in academia, publication is the primary award; in 
industry, monetary rewards are the primary incentives. There are differences in the goals: in academia, 
rewards include renown amongst peers and achievement of tenure (financial reward is also important, 
but is subservient to or co-existent with, primary goals); in industry, the primary goal is financial 
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The proposed legislation will remedy the first part of the OddzOn 
problem by allowing a university more time to assign its rights. The 
amendment introduces the change in the effective date of the invention. 
Not only will this help increase the certainty in patent law by providing an 
objective standard,131 but it will also help potential patent applicants by 
providing more time for members of a collaborative team to assess the 
value of the invention before having to create any special ownership 
arrangements.132 While a group of inventors may conceive an invention at 
point A, they may not file until point B due to decisions on who will file 
and where rights will be assigned. When A is the effective date, there is a 
duty to assign rights at the time of the invention. If rights were not 
assigned by the time the invention was made, prior art problems may 
perhaps render the invention obvious due to information shared by the 
various team members. With appropriate legislation, point B becomes the 
effective date, giving the inventors time between the conception of the 
invention and public disclosure to assign the rights and sort out legal 
issues. 
The third criterion of the OddzOn problem requires that a party who 
contributed information towards the invention is not named as an inventor. 
This may readily be remedied by naming everyone who participated in the 
research as an inventor.133 However, this may not be as easy in the very 
open research environments now becoming standard in developing 
reward (esteem among peers is also important, but is usually secondary to the bottom line of the 
company). Communication practices differ: in academia, individuals are generally very open with 
colleagues in academia and industries around the world and frequently have ties with other institutions 
from sabbaticals spent at other universities or commercial enterprises, visiting professor or research 
scholar, or consultant; in industry, individuals are necessarily much more guarded with colleagues in 
other commercial enterprises and seldom have significant ties to other enterprise organizations. There 
are also differences regarding legal issues: in academia, there are some affirmative duties to protect 
intellectual property (from the Bayh-Dole Act and industry sponsored research agreements), there is 
sometimes a lack of sophistication in business and legal matters, and the patent system is often 
congruent with publication for goals of disclosure; in industry, there are very strong incentives and 
duties to protect the employer’s intellectual property, there is a reliance on and cooperation with legal 
counsel and business advisors, and the patent system is often congruent with business goals. Lamming, 
supra note 15. 
 131. See supra note 56. 
 132. Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2003 Hearing, supra note 14, at 
38 (statement by Jeffery Paul Kushan). 
 133. Inventive entities are described in 35 U.S.C. § 166, which reads: 
When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall apply for patent jointly 
and each make the required oath . . . . Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though (1) 
they did not physically work together or at the same time, (2) each did not make the same 
type or amount of contribution, or (3) each did not make a contribution to the subject matter 
of every claim of the patent. 
35 U.S.C § 116 (2000). 
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fields.134 Ideas come from everywhere and the fundamental goal behind 
the Patent Law system is to encourage the use of ideas and information to 
push forward innovation. However, this comes dangerously close to 
“deriving” the invention or stealing someone’s ideas. Thus, careful 
consideration is due. 
The third criterion of the OddzOn problem is less straightforward, and 
the proposed amendment is not obviously beneficial. The proposed 
amendment has many arguments in its defense. First, H.R. 2391 proposes 
to remove section 102(f) from prior art contention in a section 103 
obviousness determination. Prior art has long been considered only public 
knowledge. Private communications are not public knowledge and 
arguably should not be used to invalidate a patent. This principle applies to 
all industries, whether private or public. The proposed legislation codifies 
the general understanding of the prior art purpose that preceded the 
OddzOn decision. 
In addition, the proposed amendment encourages the underlying policy 
of patent law: increasing dissemination of knowledge and disclosure of 
information. Without the amendment, in certain situations, information 
that researcher A shares may later be used against A in attempting to 
obtain a patent. Thus, researchers may not be as forthcoming with their 
technology or ideas in a research team setting for fear of later obviousness 
rejections on the future invention. In addition, the amendment will 
increase publications. If researchers and inventors do not make 
information public, another can use the idea or information obtained from 
private communications, make a minor variation, and get a patent on the 
variation without any prior art hurdles. The amendment will also 
encourage discourse between inventors and their colleagues in future 
work. Again, this encourages the use of information and spurs innovation. 
However, there are strong arguments against removing section 102(f) 
from the prior art category. The policy behind section 102(f) is the 
derivation principle. The patentee must have invented the invention 
herself. If she did not invent any part of the invention but rather derived it 
from someone else, she is not entitled to the patent. And, while the 
information may not be public in the sense that everyone has access to it, 
the inventor did have access to it. Thus, in determining if the invention 
was obvious or not, all the information available to the inventor must be 
examined. 
 134. See supra note 13. 
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There is a sense of “unfairness” when one participant brings 
information to a research team that is comprised of individuals in other 
industries or businesses, and then a later invention is patented by the other 
members of the team. This scenario will stifle innovation. Members of the 
team are going to be secretive because it is easier to misappropriate 
information from other members of the team with no prior art/obviousness 
hurdle. 
In addition, the amendment may have some anticompetitive effects. If a 
professor at a university shared information during collaboration with a 
researcher in a company, the company could easily take the information 
and patent the invention along with many obvious alterations because the 
shared information would not be prior art. The university then could not 
receive a patent on the original invention due to obviousness-type double 
patenting.135
IV. PROPOSAL 
University research is vital to the success of the United States as a 
world leader in science and scientific advances.136 While legal alternatives 
exist, such as provisional applications and continuations, situations may 
still arise where universities or their private collaborators are left 
unprotected. The mere possibility of this is enough for companies and 
universities to proceed with caution. However, whether H.R. 2391 
correctly addresses the issues involved is not clear. The allowance of extra 
time to assign patent rights is a recommended means for helping 
universities in collaborative efforts. Removing section 102(f) from prior 
art consideration in an obviousness determination, however, is a drastic 
change in the patent laws, and has the possibility of encouraging 
misappropriation, and thus is not recommended. 
Specifically relating to the OddzOn problem, H.R. 2391 addresses the 
first and third criteria.137 The proposed legislation, H.R. 2391, addresses 
the concerns of universities from the OddzOn holding and goes further to 
encourage collaborative research. As proposed by the bill, section 102(f) is 
never considered to be prior art for an obviousness determination. 
Information that could qualify only under section 102(f) could not be used 
 135. Double patenting is beyond the scope of this Note, but the proposed amendment could 
possibly have strong effects on the double patenting system.  
 136. See supra note 108. 
 137. See supra Part III. 
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in combination with prior art to render an invention obvious under 
section 103.138  
In addition, the bill also changes the critical date in section 103(c).139 
This date refers to when there is a common duty to assign. Since the 
earliest filing date usually occurs after the time of the invention, this duty 
to assign now occurs later in time. Thus, the inventors are allotted time 
after the invention to assign rights. 
This second change helps collaborations involving universities by 
allowing more time, after the invention has been conceived, to get 
permission from federal agencies to assign rights. This change in the 
effective date definition will also serve as a bright-line form of 
measurement, removing the burden of determining the time of invention. 
However, with the first part of the proposed amendment, it will be 
much easier to misappropriate the invention of another. There are two 
proposed solutions to this. First, a researcher could file a patent application 
on her idea before communicating it to someone else. But this is not 
efficient. On the other hand, an inventor could file a section 102(g)(1) 
interference if she feels her idea has been misappropriated.140 However, 
without the initial defense of using section 102(f) as prior art in the patent 
application process, the increased use of the interference will increase 
transactional costs. The amendment may also encourage patenting of 
minor variations of publicly disclosed inventions, such as inventions 
disclosed at conferences. In addition, the proposed amendment may 
decrease incentives to publish because the publication will serve as prior 
art to render a patent obvious, whereas private communications would not. 
If inventions and information are kept secret or just not published, it will 
not serve as prior art. The inventor at least has the option to gamble with 
the chance someone else invents the invention first. This flies in the face 
of the underlying policy of the patent law system.  
 138. Section 102(f) is amended by inserting, after “patented,” the following: “except that subject 
matter under this subsection shall not be considered prior art or as evidence of obviousness under 
section 103 of this title.” See H.R. 2391, supra note 100 and accompanying text. Thus, the bill changes 
the decision by the Federal Circuit in OddzOn, but will only change it prospectively. The change will 
only be effective after the date of the amendment. This change still leaves intact jurisprudence that 
serves to prevent derivation of inventions by using any public prior art to render a patent obvious 
under section 103 and using section 102(f) for novelty purposes. For example, if inventor A conveys 
information to inventor B concerning an invention, inventor B will not be able to obtain a patent on the 
same invention. 
 139. Section 103(c) is amended to include “at the time of the earliest filing date.” See H.R. 2391, 
supra note 100 and accompanying text. The critical date is changed from the date the invention was 
made to the date a patent application is file. 
 140. However, this would not work if the information was obtained out of the country. See 35 
U.S.C. § 102(g)(1) (2000). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Collaboration must be encouraged to move science along at a fast pace. 
The difficulties involved with the university transfer of patent rights 
demands legislative action. The Patent Act needs to allow university 
inventors in a collaboration more time to determine the importance of the 
invention without communications during that time serving as prior art. 
Giving universities more time to assign patent rights will allow 
collaborations to succeed. However, entirely removing section 102(f) from 
prior art consideration in an obviousness determination will leave an open 
arena for misappropriation of inventions. Therefore, H.R. 2391, as 
currently drafted, is too drastic of a change in the patent laws.  
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